A BILL is before the Parliament of Zimbabwe that will allow the government of Zimbabwe to compulsorily acquire a controlling interest in foreign-owned firms.
There has been much debate about the real agenda underpinning the legislation in as much as there was and continues to be debate about the land reform program.
The question that needs to be addressed is whether in fact the proposed indigenisation law is a case of hypocritical manipulation by a government that has run out of enemies to divert attention to or is a genuine attempt to prosecute and complete a national democratic revolution.
Independence in 1980 was expected to bring with it a comprehensive national democratic revolution encompassing civil and economic rights. At face value, indigenisation represents nothing but an attempt to democratise the economic space in as much as the liberation struggle sought to assert the rights of black and white citizens of Zimbabwe to determine their own destiny. Even the fiercest critics of Mugabe would concede that the economic empowerment of the majority is a necessary ingredient to ensure the stability of the country.
No-one can deny that the Rhodesian economy was race-based and the asset ownership architecture was racially defined. Blacks were alienated from their natural resources and some may argue that poverty of the African majority was racially induced and was not a product of market forces. In attempting to enact a law that seeks to indigenise the economy in terms of enterprise ownership, it may be argued that the government is making a significant concession that it has failed to address this enduring colonial question.
The critics of indigenisation are many and the arguments advanced play very well into the hands of any populist who can easily take advantage of the confused messages for political expediency. Some of the arguments advanced in 2007 are no different from the arguments that were advanced against the liberation movements.
In fact, even Mandela was considered a terrorist for participating in a struggle for economic and political justice and yet today his statue shares the same space in London as Churchill and Lincoln.
On the issue of land, it was argued that democratisation of ownership will necessarily lead to starvation and poverty. Equally, it is argued by many that indigenisation for a country that is in the intensive care unit is hardly the medicine required. In this argument is an allegation that black Africans cannot be trusted custodians of economic assets and, therefore, any policy that seeks to empower them is not in the national interest. The argument in its naked form is canon fodder for any politician under siege who depends for political survival on the ignorance of the poor.
The notion that the rich are in some way responsible for creating poverty is widely held not only among the poor but among intellectuals. There are many who also hold that view that workers should be in control of enterprises and entrepreneurship is necessarily a sin against the national interest. The poor are easily manipulated to believe that an exercise of transferring share certificates from the haves to the have knots will advance the cause of the national democratic revolution.
In 2007, Africa is much wiser and the world has fundamentally changed for anyone sensible to ask why the government thinks that indigenisation will cure the economic and political injury that confronts Zimbabwe. In addressing this key question that I seek to address in this article, I can only draw on my personal experience as the pioneer black entrepreneur to engage in large scale mining in Zimbabwe through the acquisition of a foreign owned company.
In 1996, I successfully negotiated the acquisition of the entire shareholding of Shabanie Mashaba Mines (Private) Limited (“SMM”) from a British-controlled company, T & N Plc. The assets were owned by a foreign private company and the transfer of ownership to a black African was a welcome development in advancing the cause of the national democratic revolution but barely ten years later, I have become a victim of not of imperialism but a government that now hypocritically wants to own the indigenisation and empowerment space.
I was the first to dare to intervene in the economy not as a micro, small or medium scale business owner but as a principal in the mainstream economy. It took 16 years from Zimbabwe’s independence for me to become a pioneer in the democratisation of the economic space. Notwithstanding the pressure from indigenisation pressure groups, the government has been unwilling to facilitate a genuine empowerment process.
For the first 10 years of independence, Zimbabwe was shunned by mining investors until the involvement of Delta Gold in the platinum industry. The lack of investment can be traced directly to the policy regime and the attitude of the government to investment.
Some will recall that the indigenisation movement only gathered steam 14 years after independence when many aspiring entrepreneurs came to the conclusion that the government was not committed to the democratizsation of the economic space.
No visible program was evident from the government regarding indigenisation. The government had in its wisdom accepted the notion that blacks could only play in the SMME space through loans and equity advances from state institutions such as SEDCO and IDC.
In some sense my acquisition of SMM was revolutionary in that it opened the flood gates for other people to think bigger. As Zimbabweans debate the need for or against indigenisation in 2007, it is important that they reflect on the actual experiences that some of us have gone through.
Firstly, President Mugabe has never been convinced that the black bourgeoisie can be trusted to prosecute the national democratic revolution. His views are no different from many former liberation heroes who believe that the state is a better custodian.
Based on this observation, it must be noted that the government had no program for empowering private black individuals and there is no evidence to demonstrate the government’s commitment to this cause in respect of its own assets. With the exception of Anthony Mandiwanza and Sylvester Nguni who inherited state-owned institutions when they were privatised, Telecel and Econet, I am not aware of any government initiative that resulted in blacks acquiring a significant stake in the enterprises on the back of a conscious effort to empower previously disadvantaged groups.
Secondly, Zanu PF has been involved in many private sector initiatives with partnerships. I am not aware of any serious attempt by the party to partner with blacks in economic activities. I am aware of President Mugabe’s close relationship to Messrs. O’Reilly, Cluff and other investors who were allowed to take advantage of opportunities in Zimbabwe as foreign players.
The party managed over the years to conclude deals with the likes of Lonrho, Tregers, Fribrolite and others. If the party had a commitment to black economic empowerment, I am sure that it would have used its poor cadres as instruments but regrettably this has not happened.
Thirdly, in the context of mining, the government in 1983 enacted the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 21:04) that effectively nationalised the output of all mining companies in respect of exports. All mining companies were not allowed to export their minerals but were forced to sell such minerals through the MMCZ.
The rationale behind the establishment of MMCZ was that the government did not trust the mining companies. The MMCZ is now 24 years old and yet no one is asking what has been achieved by this institution. If the government is already in control of all mineral exports then how on earth can it justify the enactment of the indigenisation law on the basis that mining companies are externalising?
When I acquired SMM, the government had given a dispensation to the platinum industry to be exempt from marketing through the MMCZ. SMM’s exports were marketed through MMCZ.
However, in reality the MMCZ had delegated the entire marketing to three foreign agents who had a free reign. On the day I took control of the company, SMM was sitting with stocks valued at US$30 million and debtors of an equivalent amount. MMCZ was the sole debtor of the company. The average collection period was over 120 days and yet SMM had to pay its creditors in 30 days. SMM had no direct access to the market.
SMM had no clue about the actual prices paid to the agents. MMCZ’s interest was only in respect of commissions. The staff of the MMCZ was closely aligned to the agents who occasionally facilitated payments to them. The biggest opposition to my acquisition came from the staff of MMCZ who enjoyed the benefits of a system under which they were not accountable. My first assignment as Chairman of SMM was to change the debtors’ collection period to 30 days. Two of the agents agreed to the change but the third one who was more politically connected decided to fight. He had the full support of the RBZ and Ministry of Mines and I was threatened not to change the contract terms.
At the time, a Tom Shitto was the Deputy General Manager of MMCZ. He also was close to the agents and was not supportive of the acquisition. In the end, SMM was forced to terminate the marketing arrangement and the agent owed about US$5 million to MMCZ in respect of asbestos sold and delivered that has not been paid till today. MMCZ refused to take legal action against the agent and SMM was forced to institute legal action to recover the money.
When SMM put pressure on MMCZ to pay on time and reduce stocks, the institution was not capable of responding. The imposition of MMCZ in the value chain was just an extra cost but also presented funding challenges for SMM. With a thinly capitalised marketing agent, banks were reluctant to take a view of the debtors’ book of SMM and yet MMCZ could not come to the party to finance the book. The problems are more acute for non-tradable commodities like asbestos fibre because there is no reference price of the commodity on any exchange. Accordingly, one cannot take an informed view on the debtors’ book.
When confronted the government could not defend the role of the MMCZ and finally in 1997, SMM was allowed to market its own asbestos like the platinum mines. SMM managed to takeover the staff of MMCZ who was responsible for asbestos marketing with the exception of Tom Shitto. Shitto subsequently left the MMCZ and joined one of the agents of MMCZ where he is still working until today.
The irony is that when the government decided to terminate the marketing dispensation in April 2004, Shitto’s Jewish controlled company was appointed as the sole agent to takeover the markets previously handled by my company, SAS. The government has no problem trusting foreign investors or agents but has serious problems trusting black entrepreneurs.
If one believes that the government is serious on the indigenisation front, it is important to ask the question whether its attitude to black entrepreneurs has changed. The victims of externalisation allegations have largely been blacks confirming the widely held view that the proposed legislation has nothing to do with advancing any national interest.
Although established with the purpose of protecting national interest, my experience with the MMCZ’s operations suggests otherwise. I am not even sure that the government is convinced that MMCZ has discharged its mandate efficiently and effectively. The broader question remains regarding the need of a monster like MMCZ in the value chain. Can the existence of the MMCZ co-exist with the indigenisation of the mining industry? What are the implications on the future of MMCZ if the industry is indigenised?
Fourthly, President Mugabe has never trusted the market system in so far as determining the exchange rate. When one combines the MMCZ and the RBZ in the value chain of mining, it is apparent that the government is already in control of all the affairs of mining companies. How can indigenisation co-exist with market unfriendly policies? How would black entrepreneurs relate to an environment where the value of their exports is arbitrarily determined by the state? Can an arbitrarily determined exchange rate be a facilitator for indigenisation? If all blacks with access to foreign currency are accused of externalisation, how would such victimised class of people be expected to be reliable partners in a sector that requires foreign currency?
Will the attitude of the government to black wealth accumulation change with the passing of the indigenisation laws? If the government has not managed to come up with an empowerment framework in respect of procurement over the last 27 years, what confidence do citizens have that the government is serious about advancing the national interest? Would the localisation of foreign-owned companies result in an economic turnaround? How is such a turnaround going to be financed? Who is going to finance the beneficiaries of such empowerment?
The handling of the land issue has demonstrated the inherent problem that the government faces and the inability to make choices that advance the national interest. In advancing arguments against the proposed indigenisation laws, one has to be extremely careful to avoid using a language that plays into the hands of populists who are anxiously waiting for racially insensitive arguments.
President Mugabe has taken the role that many Africans are afraid to assume i.e. of challenging the hegemony of imperialism and its instruments in form of transnational corporations. However, some of these corporations were invited by the government and offered incentives only to find out that when the political heat intensifies their host has no loyalty.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Monday, August 27, 2007
Can Africa's brand ambassador please stand up?
IN RAISING this question, I am acutely aware that even among Africans, we seem to have lost some compass in terms of what, if any, we stand for as part of the human race.
We were once colonised in the majority and yes, we were once slaves, but we have come of age. The modern Africa began a journey that we are still traversing even today in 1956 with the independence of Sudan.
As we continue to interrogate the post-colonial African experience, we should critically address the question of why the African brand seems to have no African ambassadors as if to suggest that no investment has been made by Africa to create a new and confident African that can operate in any mind and market-space.
The absence of African ambassadors is striking and unmistakable. The space is so open that people like Bono, Clinton, Madonna; Blair etc have stepped in and are now the global ambassadors for Africa’s pain, replacing the Mandelas of yesterday. The struggle for Africa’s political emancipation was led by Africans and yet the struggle for economic emancipation in the post-colonial Africa seems to have no African champions.
India, China, and other newly industrialising countries have their own indigenous ambassadors. Colonial Africa invested in its own demise through the missionaries who armed future revolutionaries with toxic knowledge and the end of colonialism was, therefore, predictable once the natives had been given the opportunity to read and write without being given an environment to practice their trades. Evidence available suggests that post-colonial Africa has invested substantially in building the continent’s human capacity that is well recognised in developed states that have been able to assimilate such skills to advantage.
The brain drain is nothing more than the externalisation of Africa’s expensive investment in human capacity. The role of the African intellectuals often created at a great cost to the continent in addressing the political and economic challenges of the continent is an issue that requires sober analysis. Where the hell are these people? Is it the case that Africa is a hopeless patient who when she invests the last dollar is not able to salvage her position in the global marketplace?
If one were to undertake an exercise to identify all the professional and business people who share an African heritage but are now calling Europe, America and other developed states as home, I have no doubt that the number would be staggering. What would be of more interest is to aggregate their earnings and wealth and compare it with Africa’s gross income. I have no doubt that the African economy represented by the Diaspora may be one of the largest economies of the world and yet there appears to be no evidence of its existence or organisation to help challenge the widely held view that Africans can never get it right.
Why would Africans in the Diaspora do well and yet their comrades in the continent are suffering often at the mercy of tyrannical African regimes? It is instructive that Jewish, Irish, Indian; Polish etc people in the Diaspora are the ambassadors of their own brands and yet Africans in the Diaspora have collectively failed to take ownership of their brand.
We lack organisation and maturity to define the African agenda when we are so privileged to do more. What is amazing is that Africans in the Diaspora are the biggest source of vocal diarrhea about why people should not take the continent seriously without ever taking a minute to locate their own actions in the value chain of the continent’s problems.
It takes Oprah to invest in a girl’s school in South Africa and no similar initiative seems to be coming from Africa’s own nameless and faceless icons. Where is Africa’s Oprah? Can Oprah still be considered as an indigenous African when history has eroded the memory of what it means to be African? But Oprah has seen what many Africans who emigrated as free people have not been able to see.
Even when you look at Africa’s institutional players, it is evident that there are very few such institutions that are owned and controlled by Africans in the Diaspora. To what extent are Africans in the Diaspora responsible for contaminating the African brand? What should Africa’s expectations be on its most costly investment? How can Africa be universally credited for being mismanaged when its most expensive investment appears to be alive and well in the sanctuary of imperialism? Incidentally, I have yet to see African clamoring to immigrate to socialist and failing nations. We all seem to want the good life.
Africa’s mines, industries, financial institutions and other key drivers of transformation are owned and controlled by non-Africans and as such the ambassadors of economic change cannot reflect anyone other than the source of capital. Africa’s supermarkets remain dominated by products produced by institutions controlled from without. What role if any have the Africans in the diaspora played in democratizing the African shelf space?
Africans, like Jews, may be resident in foreign areas but surely should have a memory about their origins. Jews in the US for instance are relevant in shaping Israel’s political economy in as much as Irish Americans are relevant to Dublin. Apart from the fragmented remittances of cash to Africa, Africans in the diaspora have failed to provide the kind of leadership that Africa needs.
In the main we do not have interests in the continent for us to be relevant in the discourse. The few that have economic interests in the continent and choose to reside outside the continent are often viewed with suspicion. The lack of organisation by Africans in the diaspora is no different from the state of play in the continent and yet the Africans in the diaspora seem to think that they have some superior advantage and are often critical of their peers who remain misgoverning the continent.
What is striking is that for example, a Professor who elects to teach in England and another who elects to be a government minister would invariably regard the one that remains in Africa as corrupt and useless even though they may have gone to the same university and qualified with the same grades. Why is it that there is a discount that is placed on service to the continent and a premium on service to former colonial masters? Only the people in the diaspora must start to think about this.
Brand ambassadors are similar to brand evangelists in that they also have a vested interest in seeing their favorite brand succeed. It should not be so much that they should attempt to influence other customers to buy a product but they should share their passion for a brand with their fellow customers.
Whereas a company markets to customers in order to sell more products, brand ambassadors must attempt to relay their passion for a brand (Africa) to non-Africans. If Africa has to succeed, it needs its own brand icons and brand ambassadors in as much as people like Mandela and others provided for the success of the civil rights movement.
A way to get any brand noticed amidst all the brands in the human marketplace is to get brand endorsement. Who is there to endorse and affirm the African brand? What are we doing as Africans to get the brand visible and projected in a positive manner or are we through our actions and in many cases our inaction adding to the undermining of the brand that we all love. The investment in Africa’s rich mineral resources is a testament that non-Africans are more passionate about the continent’s possibilities than people who call themselves Africans and choose to be armchair revolutionaries while the continent’s future is being mortgaged by the day by its unaccountable political brand ambassadors.
The key question to pose is whether brands are built by brand ambassadors. The answer is a yes and no. It is a big Yes if the brand ambassador you choose and nurture is one that is solus not promiscuous for your category. And a big and vehement No if the ambassador you choose is a promiscuous one, focusing not only on your brand but also on others! Brand ambassadors must not moonshine! Brand ambassadors who focus on one brand can achieve great results. How many of us want Africa to be a little Europe and are promiscuous brand endorsers.
In order for Africa to build a continent that is safer, secure, more comfortable, dynamic, innovative and productive, it is incumbent upon all of us to play our part without expecting others to do what we are not willing to do ourselves. For more than half a century, the African brand has been synonymous with poverty and insecurity and yet the quest for civil rights was premised on a brand promise of advantage for the majority and not the new classification of disadvantaged citizens.
In these complicated times, more than ever before in Africa’s history, citizens have no choice but to turn to the Africans in the diaspora to help solve many of the most complex problems confronting the continent. The diaspora African brand is well known in the global labour market and is a valuable asset that must be harnessed and deployed to the advantage of the continent. Brands that are recognised and respected should help the African cause.
One of the ways Africa can build and protect its image is by using the diaspora African and resources to leverage its position in a globally competitive world. The sustainable development of the continent can only be guaranteed and inspired by its own people otherwise the risk of non-Africans playing football with the continent’s vast untapped resources is high.
In conclusion, it is the responsibility of all Africans to stand up and be counted. We must be the change that we want to see. The only power we have is the power to organise. Are we organised? Who is going to organise us? How can we make our money speak for us? Don’t assume that anyone will work in your interest and bring the change that you want to see. Only you can make the difference.
We were once colonised in the majority and yes, we were once slaves, but we have come of age. The modern Africa began a journey that we are still traversing even today in 1956 with the independence of Sudan.
As we continue to interrogate the post-colonial African experience, we should critically address the question of why the African brand seems to have no African ambassadors as if to suggest that no investment has been made by Africa to create a new and confident African that can operate in any mind and market-space.
The absence of African ambassadors is striking and unmistakable. The space is so open that people like Bono, Clinton, Madonna; Blair etc have stepped in and are now the global ambassadors for Africa’s pain, replacing the Mandelas of yesterday. The struggle for Africa’s political emancipation was led by Africans and yet the struggle for economic emancipation in the post-colonial Africa seems to have no African champions.
India, China, and other newly industrialising countries have their own indigenous ambassadors. Colonial Africa invested in its own demise through the missionaries who armed future revolutionaries with toxic knowledge and the end of colonialism was, therefore, predictable once the natives had been given the opportunity to read and write without being given an environment to practice their trades. Evidence available suggests that post-colonial Africa has invested substantially in building the continent’s human capacity that is well recognised in developed states that have been able to assimilate such skills to advantage.
The brain drain is nothing more than the externalisation of Africa’s expensive investment in human capacity. The role of the African intellectuals often created at a great cost to the continent in addressing the political and economic challenges of the continent is an issue that requires sober analysis. Where the hell are these people? Is it the case that Africa is a hopeless patient who when she invests the last dollar is not able to salvage her position in the global marketplace?
If one were to undertake an exercise to identify all the professional and business people who share an African heritage but are now calling Europe, America and other developed states as home, I have no doubt that the number would be staggering. What would be of more interest is to aggregate their earnings and wealth and compare it with Africa’s gross income. I have no doubt that the African economy represented by the Diaspora may be one of the largest economies of the world and yet there appears to be no evidence of its existence or organisation to help challenge the widely held view that Africans can never get it right.
Why would Africans in the Diaspora do well and yet their comrades in the continent are suffering often at the mercy of tyrannical African regimes? It is instructive that Jewish, Irish, Indian; Polish etc people in the Diaspora are the ambassadors of their own brands and yet Africans in the Diaspora have collectively failed to take ownership of their brand.
We lack organisation and maturity to define the African agenda when we are so privileged to do more. What is amazing is that Africans in the Diaspora are the biggest source of vocal diarrhea about why people should not take the continent seriously without ever taking a minute to locate their own actions in the value chain of the continent’s problems.
It takes Oprah to invest in a girl’s school in South Africa and no similar initiative seems to be coming from Africa’s own nameless and faceless icons. Where is Africa’s Oprah? Can Oprah still be considered as an indigenous African when history has eroded the memory of what it means to be African? But Oprah has seen what many Africans who emigrated as free people have not been able to see.
Even when you look at Africa’s institutional players, it is evident that there are very few such institutions that are owned and controlled by Africans in the Diaspora. To what extent are Africans in the Diaspora responsible for contaminating the African brand? What should Africa’s expectations be on its most costly investment? How can Africa be universally credited for being mismanaged when its most expensive investment appears to be alive and well in the sanctuary of imperialism? Incidentally, I have yet to see African clamoring to immigrate to socialist and failing nations. We all seem to want the good life.
Africa’s mines, industries, financial institutions and other key drivers of transformation are owned and controlled by non-Africans and as such the ambassadors of economic change cannot reflect anyone other than the source of capital. Africa’s supermarkets remain dominated by products produced by institutions controlled from without. What role if any have the Africans in the diaspora played in democratizing the African shelf space?
Africans, like Jews, may be resident in foreign areas but surely should have a memory about their origins. Jews in the US for instance are relevant in shaping Israel’s political economy in as much as Irish Americans are relevant to Dublin. Apart from the fragmented remittances of cash to Africa, Africans in the diaspora have failed to provide the kind of leadership that Africa needs.
In the main we do not have interests in the continent for us to be relevant in the discourse. The few that have economic interests in the continent and choose to reside outside the continent are often viewed with suspicion. The lack of organisation by Africans in the diaspora is no different from the state of play in the continent and yet the Africans in the diaspora seem to think that they have some superior advantage and are often critical of their peers who remain misgoverning the continent.
What is striking is that for example, a Professor who elects to teach in England and another who elects to be a government minister would invariably regard the one that remains in Africa as corrupt and useless even though they may have gone to the same university and qualified with the same grades. Why is it that there is a discount that is placed on service to the continent and a premium on service to former colonial masters? Only the people in the diaspora must start to think about this.
Brand ambassadors are similar to brand evangelists in that they also have a vested interest in seeing their favorite brand succeed. It should not be so much that they should attempt to influence other customers to buy a product but they should share their passion for a brand with their fellow customers.
Whereas a company markets to customers in order to sell more products, brand ambassadors must attempt to relay their passion for a brand (Africa) to non-Africans. If Africa has to succeed, it needs its own brand icons and brand ambassadors in as much as people like Mandela and others provided for the success of the civil rights movement.
A way to get any brand noticed amidst all the brands in the human marketplace is to get brand endorsement. Who is there to endorse and affirm the African brand? What are we doing as Africans to get the brand visible and projected in a positive manner or are we through our actions and in many cases our inaction adding to the undermining of the brand that we all love. The investment in Africa’s rich mineral resources is a testament that non-Africans are more passionate about the continent’s possibilities than people who call themselves Africans and choose to be armchair revolutionaries while the continent’s future is being mortgaged by the day by its unaccountable political brand ambassadors.
The key question to pose is whether brands are built by brand ambassadors. The answer is a yes and no. It is a big Yes if the brand ambassador you choose and nurture is one that is solus not promiscuous for your category. And a big and vehement No if the ambassador you choose is a promiscuous one, focusing not only on your brand but also on others! Brand ambassadors must not moonshine! Brand ambassadors who focus on one brand can achieve great results. How many of us want Africa to be a little Europe and are promiscuous brand endorsers.
In order for Africa to build a continent that is safer, secure, more comfortable, dynamic, innovative and productive, it is incumbent upon all of us to play our part without expecting others to do what we are not willing to do ourselves. For more than half a century, the African brand has been synonymous with poverty and insecurity and yet the quest for civil rights was premised on a brand promise of advantage for the majority and not the new classification of disadvantaged citizens.
In these complicated times, more than ever before in Africa’s history, citizens have no choice but to turn to the Africans in the diaspora to help solve many of the most complex problems confronting the continent. The diaspora African brand is well known in the global labour market and is a valuable asset that must be harnessed and deployed to the advantage of the continent. Brands that are recognised and respected should help the African cause.
One of the ways Africa can build and protect its image is by using the diaspora African and resources to leverage its position in a globally competitive world. The sustainable development of the continent can only be guaranteed and inspired by its own people otherwise the risk of non-Africans playing football with the continent’s vast untapped resources is high.
In conclusion, it is the responsibility of all Africans to stand up and be counted. We must be the change that we want to see. The only power we have is the power to organise. Are we organised? Who is going to organise us? How can we make our money speak for us? Don’t assume that anyone will work in your interest and bring the change that you want to see. Only you can make the difference.
Monday, August 20, 2007
Is Zimbabwe a candidate for economic surgery?
THE Southern African Development Community (Sadc) Chairman, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, summed up the position of the regional grouping’s political leadership on Zimbabwe at last week’s summit by saying: “We also feel that the problems in Zimbabwe have been exaggerated. We feel they will solve their economic problems.”
The summit provided a unique forum for leaders of SADC and their social partners to explore some of the most pressing issues of the day and Zimbabwe was one such issue.
The position taken at the summit on Zimbabwe is reflection of a widely held view that the root cause of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is the unresolved colonially generated asset ownership structure.
It is evident that there is consensus among many African leaders that issues related to economic democracy in the continent necessarily attracts a negative response from the former colonial masters and their alleged puppets. To this end, if one accepts that the root cause of the Zimbabwean crisis is the position taken by Mugabe to democratise land ownership, then the Zimbabwean crisis with attendant targeted sanctions is seen as a necessary price to pay for the complete emancipation of the country.
Mugabe’s views are shared by many in Africa and the developing world for different reasons. They argue that anyone who takes a fight against Anglo American hegemony can never be wrong and, if anything, he deserves support. People, who believe in pan-Africanism, see in Mugabe the fighting spirit that is missing in many post-colonial states that still face the challenge of eradicating the enduring economic legacies of colonialism.
The standing ovation Mugabe received in Lusaka is no different from the treatment he has enjoyed at many conferences. In fact, the only thing that seems to unite Mwanawasa and his political nemesis, Michael Sata, is their common and shared position on the origins of the Zimbabwean crisis.
The success of the Lusaka summit in the eyes of Harare demonstrates that the message from Zimbabwe’s opposition has failed to resonate with Africa’s critical players. This raises the following questions: Is the Zimbabwean opposition misinformed or misdirected? To the extent that the opposition believes that Mugabe is the problem, why is it that they seem to fail to communicate this? If Zimbabwe faces a leadership crisis, does SADC have any locus to intervene, let alone pronounce an opinion?
If there is a common theme that characterises the Zimbabwean crisis, it is leadership: what constitutes good leadership, how (and, indeed, whether) the lack of it is responsible for the Zimbabwean crisis, what criteria should be applied when assessing it in the context of a post-colonial state? What should be the role of the opposition and how should citizens weigh the various indicators – from maximising national wealth (poverty eradication) to brand-building and longer term considerations such as nation building?
And given the emergence of China, India, UAE and other nations as global players and the pace of globalisation, can one expect to apply one set of criteria to what makes for good leadership in very different cultural contexts? Anglo-Saxon models have dominated the theory and practice of leadership for so long that it may be difficult to accept that other models may be relevant and appropriate.
When there remains immense differences of perceived leadership qualities between Africans and Anglo Americans, how much do we as Africans have to start investing in understanding this important variable in nation building? Does Africa need democracy to progress? If so, what kind of leadership should it have? What interests ought to inform it?
It is more than 27 years since Zimbabwe became an independent and sovereign state. It is salutary, looking back, to remember the illusions which were commonplace at the time. Some Zimbabweans believed that independence accompanied by eloquent speeches about how Europe underdeveloped Africa would quickly solve the country’s problems.
In the West, the grant of an Anglo Saxon type of constitution was considered as a necessary and sufficient condition by itself to institutionalise a functioning constitutional democracy underpinned by a scrupulous respect of the Rule of Law, human rights, accountability and transparency.
The euphoria that characterised the independence atmosphere in Zimbabwe was well founded in Robert Mugabe’s reconciliatory speeches and approach to nation building.
Many were convinced that a new dawn had visited Zimbabwe and the country had the leadership it deserved to rid itself of the negative vestiges of colonialism. That was then and now the illusions have largely evaporated.
Zimbabwe under Mugabe has lived through some challenges from the construction of a post-colonial dispensation in which all citizens were allowed to assert their sovereign right to makes laws and regulate their lives as they wish to the well acknowledged investment in the social and physical infrastructure of the country using a small tax base inherited from the colonial state. Regrettably the post colonial state did not address issues related to the democratisation of the economy resulting in the current state of affairs where the population has grown accompanied by a decaying national economy.
The financing of the post-colonial state investments was largely done from borrowed sources and not from taxes. Any rational leader would have known that the relationship between the state, the protector of collective interests and the market, and the protectors of individual interests, is critical for economic growth. In assessing whether Mugabe has been a good leader for Zimbabwe, one has to look at how his administration has balanced the interests of the market with that of the state.
The failure of the post-colonial economic model was already evident in the late 1980s to the extent that the IMF, ordinarily a fire brigade, was invited by none other than Mugabe to intervene with balance of payments support.
The Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) or euphemistically referred to as The Extended Suffering of African People was adopted and implemented not by the opposition but by a Zanu PF government. The program was abandoned by the government of Zimbabwe because the hard policy choices that needed to be made could not find leaders with the courage to make them.
While the SADC leaders have accepted that targeted economic sanctions have a causal link with the Zimbabwean crisis, they surely must be aware that the economic objectives of growth for any nation must be harmonised with the objectives associated with the political order. The designing of growth strategies must necessarily include the promotion of factors that support the democratisation of society, the defence of sovereignty and the self determination of citizens.
What is evident is that no growth strategy will succeed if it is underpinned by an ideology that is premised on the state as the referee and player. Yes, SADC may have endorsed the Zimbabwean rescue plan like the multilateral institutions have done in the past but the success of such plans have to deal with the leadership question without any equivocation.
Anyone who thinks seriously about Africa and indeed Zimbabwe’s future will value a conversation on the leadership question. Can Mugabe reinvent himself and make the choices that he has failed to make over the last 27 years? Is Mugabe’s world view on issues of governance, rule of law, and leadership consistent with a view that is required for a progressive nation?
Some have argued that when the Emperor is naked it is difficult for friends and foes to inform him. Could any rational person have expected SADC leaders to tell Mugabe where the root cause of the Zimbabwean crisis is? Does SADC have such a mandate anyway?
What is evident to many and I am sure to Africa’s leaders is that the course of nation building in Zimbabwe has encountered serious set backs. Zimbabweans’ hope for a free democratic existence as the background for stable national development has been dashed.
Huge treasuries of material resources and opportunities for development have been dissipated. And more worrying is that the current leadership does not seem to have what it takes to motivate citizens to recover sufficient strength to resume the fight to build a future for themselves (rather than worrying about daily existence) and their families.
Morale is at its lowest in Zimbabwe for justifiable reasons. A rescue package from SADC will not rescue the injury to the psyche of citizens who legitimately had a right to expect better from their leaders. Will Mugabe’s re-election next year change the climate of hopelessness that is evident in Zimbabwe? Even if sanctions were lifted today, how would that address the leadership credibility issue?
The 2008 elections have been dubbed the economic emancipation elections. President Mugabe is convinced that a fresh mandate will allow him to use the state to empower the majority economically. While this may be exciting news to the naïve, how is this going to be done against a background of a bankrupt state and economically vulnerable citizens? Even if all the economic assets were transferred to the state/selected individuals, would that promote growth and prosperity?
Someone said a long time ago you cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. No government in the world has managed to come up with an instrument where the fear of being arrested induced favourable supply response. While the government of Zimbabwe may believe that arresting businesspersons will arrest inflation and restore economic order, I am not sure whether SADC leaders (who incidentally are not pursuing such policies in their own countries) seriously believe that Zimbabwe is a candidate for economic surgery.
When Margaret Thatcher became big headed and a stumbling block to progress, the Conservative Party managed to remove her. Equally, Tony Blair got the same medicine. In Zimbabwe it appears that some people believe that only one man can solve the colonial injury however defined and that person has no obligation to explain how he will be able to implement the new ideas of empowerment when he has failed to do the same for agriculture.
I believe that Mwanawasa may be cynically encouraging Mugabe to hang in there so that he can benefit from the contribution of Zimbabwean settler farmers. If Mugabe goes, I have no doubt what is in Mwanawasa’s mind about the sustainability of the agrarian revolution that is underpinned by Zimbabwean skills in his country. Would the farmers elect to remain in Zambia or return to Zimbabwe?
Leadership plays a central role in managing perceptions. Today Zimbabwe is less confident that it was 27 years ago. It is now a confident member of the class of nations that can be classified as failed states. The frightening economic indicators have escaped the attention of the SADC leaders. Apart from the expected anti-imperialist rhetoric, the current political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is testament to wrong, irresponsible and backward looking policies and weak core values of democracy, freedom and the Rule of Law. Many democratic nations would find it difficult to trust a leader that has been at the helm of a crumbling state to continue experimenting with the nation building project.
While the world waits for signals that Zimbabweans will take ownership of their problems, the tragedy is that Zimbabweans expect change to come from without. The message from the SADC summit is that only Zimbabwean leaders can lead and shape Zimbabwe. A committed and accountable leadership that is forward looking can find the world and indeed SADC a reliable partner in delivering a better future for Zimbabwe and its people.
The world is anxiously waiting for Zimbabweans in general to have an opportunity to genuinely express their choice about who should govern them notwithstanding the privatisation of the state and implications thereof on freedom of choice. The illusions of independence have been sufficiently exposed to allow Zimbabwean citizens to use the ballot as the instrument for change.
In the final analysis the responsibility must lie with those who have dedicated their lives to the change agenda to demonstrate that bad leadership has a lot to do with the Zimbabwean crisis. Zimbabwe needs a smart system and not necessarily a smart leader.
The summit provided a unique forum for leaders of SADC and their social partners to explore some of the most pressing issues of the day and Zimbabwe was one such issue.
The position taken at the summit on Zimbabwe is reflection of a widely held view that the root cause of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is the unresolved colonially generated asset ownership structure.
It is evident that there is consensus among many African leaders that issues related to economic democracy in the continent necessarily attracts a negative response from the former colonial masters and their alleged puppets. To this end, if one accepts that the root cause of the Zimbabwean crisis is the position taken by Mugabe to democratise land ownership, then the Zimbabwean crisis with attendant targeted sanctions is seen as a necessary price to pay for the complete emancipation of the country.
Mugabe’s views are shared by many in Africa and the developing world for different reasons. They argue that anyone who takes a fight against Anglo American hegemony can never be wrong and, if anything, he deserves support. People, who believe in pan-Africanism, see in Mugabe the fighting spirit that is missing in many post-colonial states that still face the challenge of eradicating the enduring economic legacies of colonialism.
The standing ovation Mugabe received in Lusaka is no different from the treatment he has enjoyed at many conferences. In fact, the only thing that seems to unite Mwanawasa and his political nemesis, Michael Sata, is their common and shared position on the origins of the Zimbabwean crisis.
The success of the Lusaka summit in the eyes of Harare demonstrates that the message from Zimbabwe’s opposition has failed to resonate with Africa’s critical players. This raises the following questions: Is the Zimbabwean opposition misinformed or misdirected? To the extent that the opposition believes that Mugabe is the problem, why is it that they seem to fail to communicate this? If Zimbabwe faces a leadership crisis, does SADC have any locus to intervene, let alone pronounce an opinion?
If there is a common theme that characterises the Zimbabwean crisis, it is leadership: what constitutes good leadership, how (and, indeed, whether) the lack of it is responsible for the Zimbabwean crisis, what criteria should be applied when assessing it in the context of a post-colonial state? What should be the role of the opposition and how should citizens weigh the various indicators – from maximising national wealth (poverty eradication) to brand-building and longer term considerations such as nation building?
And given the emergence of China, India, UAE and other nations as global players and the pace of globalisation, can one expect to apply one set of criteria to what makes for good leadership in very different cultural contexts? Anglo-Saxon models have dominated the theory and practice of leadership for so long that it may be difficult to accept that other models may be relevant and appropriate.
When there remains immense differences of perceived leadership qualities between Africans and Anglo Americans, how much do we as Africans have to start investing in understanding this important variable in nation building? Does Africa need democracy to progress? If so, what kind of leadership should it have? What interests ought to inform it?
It is more than 27 years since Zimbabwe became an independent and sovereign state. It is salutary, looking back, to remember the illusions which were commonplace at the time. Some Zimbabweans believed that independence accompanied by eloquent speeches about how Europe underdeveloped Africa would quickly solve the country’s problems.
In the West, the grant of an Anglo Saxon type of constitution was considered as a necessary and sufficient condition by itself to institutionalise a functioning constitutional democracy underpinned by a scrupulous respect of the Rule of Law, human rights, accountability and transparency.
The euphoria that characterised the independence atmosphere in Zimbabwe was well founded in Robert Mugabe’s reconciliatory speeches and approach to nation building.
Many were convinced that a new dawn had visited Zimbabwe and the country had the leadership it deserved to rid itself of the negative vestiges of colonialism. That was then and now the illusions have largely evaporated.
Zimbabwe under Mugabe has lived through some challenges from the construction of a post-colonial dispensation in which all citizens were allowed to assert their sovereign right to makes laws and regulate their lives as they wish to the well acknowledged investment in the social and physical infrastructure of the country using a small tax base inherited from the colonial state. Regrettably the post colonial state did not address issues related to the democratisation of the economy resulting in the current state of affairs where the population has grown accompanied by a decaying national economy.
The financing of the post-colonial state investments was largely done from borrowed sources and not from taxes. Any rational leader would have known that the relationship between the state, the protector of collective interests and the market, and the protectors of individual interests, is critical for economic growth. In assessing whether Mugabe has been a good leader for Zimbabwe, one has to look at how his administration has balanced the interests of the market with that of the state.
The failure of the post-colonial economic model was already evident in the late 1980s to the extent that the IMF, ordinarily a fire brigade, was invited by none other than Mugabe to intervene with balance of payments support.
The Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) or euphemistically referred to as The Extended Suffering of African People was adopted and implemented not by the opposition but by a Zanu PF government. The program was abandoned by the government of Zimbabwe because the hard policy choices that needed to be made could not find leaders with the courage to make them.
While the SADC leaders have accepted that targeted economic sanctions have a causal link with the Zimbabwean crisis, they surely must be aware that the economic objectives of growth for any nation must be harmonised with the objectives associated with the political order. The designing of growth strategies must necessarily include the promotion of factors that support the democratisation of society, the defence of sovereignty and the self determination of citizens.
What is evident is that no growth strategy will succeed if it is underpinned by an ideology that is premised on the state as the referee and player. Yes, SADC may have endorsed the Zimbabwean rescue plan like the multilateral institutions have done in the past but the success of such plans have to deal with the leadership question without any equivocation.
Anyone who thinks seriously about Africa and indeed Zimbabwe’s future will value a conversation on the leadership question. Can Mugabe reinvent himself and make the choices that he has failed to make over the last 27 years? Is Mugabe’s world view on issues of governance, rule of law, and leadership consistent with a view that is required for a progressive nation?
Some have argued that when the Emperor is naked it is difficult for friends and foes to inform him. Could any rational person have expected SADC leaders to tell Mugabe where the root cause of the Zimbabwean crisis is? Does SADC have such a mandate anyway?
What is evident to many and I am sure to Africa’s leaders is that the course of nation building in Zimbabwe has encountered serious set backs. Zimbabweans’ hope for a free democratic existence as the background for stable national development has been dashed.
Huge treasuries of material resources and opportunities for development have been dissipated. And more worrying is that the current leadership does not seem to have what it takes to motivate citizens to recover sufficient strength to resume the fight to build a future for themselves (rather than worrying about daily existence) and their families.
Morale is at its lowest in Zimbabwe for justifiable reasons. A rescue package from SADC will not rescue the injury to the psyche of citizens who legitimately had a right to expect better from their leaders. Will Mugabe’s re-election next year change the climate of hopelessness that is evident in Zimbabwe? Even if sanctions were lifted today, how would that address the leadership credibility issue?
The 2008 elections have been dubbed the economic emancipation elections. President Mugabe is convinced that a fresh mandate will allow him to use the state to empower the majority economically. While this may be exciting news to the naïve, how is this going to be done against a background of a bankrupt state and economically vulnerable citizens? Even if all the economic assets were transferred to the state/selected individuals, would that promote growth and prosperity?
Someone said a long time ago you cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. No government in the world has managed to come up with an instrument where the fear of being arrested induced favourable supply response. While the government of Zimbabwe may believe that arresting businesspersons will arrest inflation and restore economic order, I am not sure whether SADC leaders (who incidentally are not pursuing such policies in their own countries) seriously believe that Zimbabwe is a candidate for economic surgery.
When Margaret Thatcher became big headed and a stumbling block to progress, the Conservative Party managed to remove her. Equally, Tony Blair got the same medicine. In Zimbabwe it appears that some people believe that only one man can solve the colonial injury however defined and that person has no obligation to explain how he will be able to implement the new ideas of empowerment when he has failed to do the same for agriculture.
I believe that Mwanawasa may be cynically encouraging Mugabe to hang in there so that he can benefit from the contribution of Zimbabwean settler farmers. If Mugabe goes, I have no doubt what is in Mwanawasa’s mind about the sustainability of the agrarian revolution that is underpinned by Zimbabwean skills in his country. Would the farmers elect to remain in Zambia or return to Zimbabwe?
Leadership plays a central role in managing perceptions. Today Zimbabwe is less confident that it was 27 years ago. It is now a confident member of the class of nations that can be classified as failed states. The frightening economic indicators have escaped the attention of the SADC leaders. Apart from the expected anti-imperialist rhetoric, the current political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is testament to wrong, irresponsible and backward looking policies and weak core values of democracy, freedom and the Rule of Law. Many democratic nations would find it difficult to trust a leader that has been at the helm of a crumbling state to continue experimenting with the nation building project.
While the world waits for signals that Zimbabweans will take ownership of their problems, the tragedy is that Zimbabweans expect change to come from without. The message from the SADC summit is that only Zimbabwean leaders can lead and shape Zimbabwe. A committed and accountable leadership that is forward looking can find the world and indeed SADC a reliable partner in delivering a better future for Zimbabwe and its people.
The world is anxiously waiting for Zimbabweans in general to have an opportunity to genuinely express their choice about who should govern them notwithstanding the privatisation of the state and implications thereof on freedom of choice. The illusions of independence have been sufficiently exposed to allow Zimbabwean citizens to use the ballot as the instrument for change.
In the final analysis the responsibility must lie with those who have dedicated their lives to the change agenda to demonstrate that bad leadership has a lot to do with the Zimbabwean crisis. Zimbabwe needs a smart system and not necessarily a smart leader.
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Zimbabwe's leadership paradox
THE word paradox is often used interchangeably and wrongly with contradiction but whereas a contradiction asserts its own opposite, many paradoxes do allow for resolution of some kind.
The recognition of ambiguities, equivocations and unstated assumptions underlying known Zimbabwean leadership paradoxes has led to significant and material confusion among the contenders for power to the extent that the real focus on the change agenda has become obfuscated.
Twenty-seven is a significant number in Southern Africa. One of Africa’s most illustrious sons, former President Mandela, spent 27 years in prison in as much as President Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda have spent the same amount of time in power.
When Mandela was released from prison, it was obvious to the custodians of apartheid as it was to its victims that change had to come and the new order could not accommodate the old order. There was no discussion of any third way but a new direction informed by new values and political morality.
When Zambians speaking eloquently through the ballot forced President Kaunda out of office, it was obvious that country needed a new beginning without him. However, President Kaunda like many African leaders, has not accepted that he was responsible for lowering the standards of political leadership in his country and for giving birth to Frederick Chiluba.
When Chiluba took over, the country was a basket case and at the time people used to refer euphemistically to KK (being the President’s initials) as Kwacha Killer. Indeed, the kwacha was battered by KK’s policies and after 27 years of misguided humanistic policies, Zambians were poorer than at independence.
Zambia’s brain trust was largely externalised and those that remained were too afraid to be the change they wanted and left the job to the trade union movement to promote the change agenda.
Today, it is not surprising that President Kaunda is one of the public admirers of President Mugabe. He feels strongly that Zambians made a mistake by electing President Chiluba and in a sense he also feels that Zimbabweans will make the same mistake if they were to elect anyone from the trade union movement.
Unfortunately, President Kaunda had no choice in deciding his successor and never woke up to the fact that through his policies and programs he had denied his fellow countrymen the right to decide their political destiny.
The risks associated with challenging the hegemony of ruling parties in Africa are well known and are no different from the ones that prevailed under a colonial state. As a result, the successors to tyrannical regimes need not fit into an intellectually defined straight jacket.
Mandela became a leader because he symbolised the suffering of the majority. If he had not spent 27 years in prison, he may never have acquired the iconic status he has today or become the founding father of South Africa. Equally if President Chiluba was not a victim of Kaunda’s policies, Zambians may never have voted him into office.
In the case of Zimbabwe, can it be the case that people who have not endured the suffering of the bad policies of Mugabe will be the beneficiaries?
Arguments have been advanced that the problem in Zimbabwe is that the opposition has no credible leadership and, therefore, the prospect of unseating President Mugabe is remote. What is undisputed however is the fact that Morgan Tsvangirai has given more headaches to Mugabe than anyone has in the last 27 years.
Zimbabwe has known of no other leader than President Mugabe. As Mugabe approaches 28 years in office and an election whose outcome may already be pre-determined not because of the will of the people but due to the power of incumbency, it is important that Zimbabweans ask themselves some basic questions whose answers will inform what kind of Zimbabwe they should have.
Having watched Arthur Mutambara’s BBC Hardtalk interview, and his paradoxical message, it occurred to me that it is important that the question of succession and leadership be interrogated critically now more than ever.
While it is undeniable that Mugabe is an eloquent and educated leader, it is also undeniable that his tenure in Zimbabwe has not produced the kind of results that should be associated with such an intellectual giant.
It is also common cause that with the exception of a few including the late Vice President Muzenda, Mugabe’s cabinet since independence has been dominated by intellectuals. What is clear is that such leadership has failed to give hope to Zimbabweans and has dismally failed to fight poverty and entrench the Rule of Law.
While Mugabe would like the world to believe that he is the champion of the poor, the last 27 years has demonstrated that he has no faith in poor minds and if anything he would rather have Jonathan Moyo, Joseph Made, Patrick Chinamasa and others than have a Tsvangirai or Wellington Chibhebhe in his cabinet, notwithstanding the fact that the latter may be more popular and in touch with the poor.
The difference between what Mutambara may want to see in Zimbabwe and what Mugabe believes in may be the same. What is evident is that Mugabe’s elite approach to development has failed in as much as Kaunda’s same approach failed as well and produced a Chiluba with the unavoidable consequences.
At the heart of the Mutambara and Tsvangirai feud is the failure by many people to recognise that the real agenda for change has to focus on Mugabe and not on the victims. Mugabe has been in charge for 27 years. He is after all the President of MDC, Zanu PF, and all other Zimbabweans. When he took the oath of office he did not do so as the President of a club called Zanu PF but as a President of Zimbabwe.
The sovereignty of Zimbabwe is not owned by Mugabe or Zanu PF but by the people. A leader should therefore emerge from the people irrespective of whether he is intelligent or not as long as the people are given a fair chance to express their will.
The question is whether President Mugabe’s reign has produced an environment in which the citizens of Zimbabwe are free to express their will.
In addition, President Mugabe, as is the case for any sitting president, has the natural advantage of incumbency. He has access to state resources without which it is plausible that Zanu PF would have disintegrated into worse factions than are evident in the opposition.
Has the President used his powers to promote oneness among Zimbabweans? Or has he used the Presidency to divide? How much of the state resources are being used to promote partisan interests? Is the state machinery neutral in the contestation for power or is it an instrument for entrenching the status quo ante? To what extent is the opposition able to access state resources to function?
Mugabe has won all the elections since independence. Is it the case that if he did not have state power that he would have won all these elections? One has to explain why it is the case that Zimbabwe is well endowed with great minds and yet on the radar screen of the opposition, such great intellectual minds are missing in action. If they are missing in action, why should people like Tsvangirai be excluded? Does a President have to be an intellectual for the country to have the change it deserves? Who should the change speak to?
Today, even Mugabe accepts that Tsvangirai has the confidence of the educated and working people while Zanu PF has the support of the rural masses. If this is the case, then Tsvangirai should be more qualified to lead the rural masses on the back of the allegation that he is not an intellectual and Mugabe should be the leader of the minority. Has Mugabe’s policies really helped the poor? How can Mugabe be compared with Tsvangirai when the latter has not been given a chance?
Ultimately the citizens should own the change agenda and yet in the case of Zimbabwe many intellectuals think that they should own the change agenda irrespective of their contribution to such change. While many would like change to take place in Zimbabwe, it is evident that they would rather invest as little as possible in such agendas.
However, if there is no investment in any process, the outcome may not be what you want. Mugabe has invested in making Zimbabwe a country in which liberation credentials and not service is the key to power. Under this construction, if you were never part of the struggle then you are less Zimbabwean and yet no one bothered to change the constitution to reflect such thinking.
If it is accepted that to be a President of Zimbabwe you must have participated in the struggle for independence, then surely how can people like Tsvangirai who have struggled for a better and new Zimbabwe be excluded from leading the post Mugabe era? Should the focus be on Tsvangirai or the people of Zimbabwe?
We now know that MDC was divided for whatever reasons in October 2005 and two formations emerged. Barely two years later, the formation that broke away from the Vatican and chose its own Pope would now want to be under the same Pope they vilify. If the new Pope who accepted to lead the formation strongly feels that he does not have what it takes to deliver the change, then surely he must resign or join the winners.
In as much as the Mutambara faction would not support Mugabe because of values, it should also be the case that they should not support Tsvangirai for the same reasons. However, if they have come to the inescapable conclusion that Tsvangirai, like Mandela, represents the majority then it is not too late to rally behind him and produce the baby that Zimbabweans want.
Yes it is easy to talk of the third way but without a leader such kind of language does not help the country move forward. Equally the talk of one candidate like the Kenyans discovered does not help advance the cause of democracy.
It should not be up to Tsvangirai to decide who should govern and he rightly refused to endorse a scheme in which leaders will be packaged in elite circles without the participation of the citizens.
If the Mutambara faction is confident that it has the people then what Tsvangirai is proposing makes sense. Why would Mutambara want Tsvangirai to enter into contracts on behalf of sovereign people?
Having accepted that the future of Zimbabwe may be led by someone less intellectual than Mugabe, it is important that citizens invest in ensuring that there are checks and balances that will allow for the development of society where pluralism can thrive.
Such investment should start now and it should not be the responsibility of the leader to invest in such an institutional framework of tolerance and justice but it should be incumbent upon all to start changing the conversations of hate into conversations of interest driven change. Ideological discussions need to start now with a view to locating the post-Mugabe era in an ideological matrix that is informed by global trends and developments.
The recognition of ambiguities, equivocations and unstated assumptions underlying known Zimbabwean leadership paradoxes has led to significant and material confusion among the contenders for power to the extent that the real focus on the change agenda has become obfuscated.
Twenty-seven is a significant number in Southern Africa. One of Africa’s most illustrious sons, former President Mandela, spent 27 years in prison in as much as President Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda have spent the same amount of time in power.
When Mandela was released from prison, it was obvious to the custodians of apartheid as it was to its victims that change had to come and the new order could not accommodate the old order. There was no discussion of any third way but a new direction informed by new values and political morality.
When Zambians speaking eloquently through the ballot forced President Kaunda out of office, it was obvious that country needed a new beginning without him. However, President Kaunda like many African leaders, has not accepted that he was responsible for lowering the standards of political leadership in his country and for giving birth to Frederick Chiluba.
When Chiluba took over, the country was a basket case and at the time people used to refer euphemistically to KK (being the President’s initials) as Kwacha Killer. Indeed, the kwacha was battered by KK’s policies and after 27 years of misguided humanistic policies, Zambians were poorer than at independence.
Zambia’s brain trust was largely externalised and those that remained were too afraid to be the change they wanted and left the job to the trade union movement to promote the change agenda.
Today, it is not surprising that President Kaunda is one of the public admirers of President Mugabe. He feels strongly that Zambians made a mistake by electing President Chiluba and in a sense he also feels that Zimbabweans will make the same mistake if they were to elect anyone from the trade union movement.
Unfortunately, President Kaunda had no choice in deciding his successor and never woke up to the fact that through his policies and programs he had denied his fellow countrymen the right to decide their political destiny.
The risks associated with challenging the hegemony of ruling parties in Africa are well known and are no different from the ones that prevailed under a colonial state. As a result, the successors to tyrannical regimes need not fit into an intellectually defined straight jacket.
Mandela became a leader because he symbolised the suffering of the majority. If he had not spent 27 years in prison, he may never have acquired the iconic status he has today or become the founding father of South Africa. Equally if President Chiluba was not a victim of Kaunda’s policies, Zambians may never have voted him into office.
In the case of Zimbabwe, can it be the case that people who have not endured the suffering of the bad policies of Mugabe will be the beneficiaries?
Arguments have been advanced that the problem in Zimbabwe is that the opposition has no credible leadership and, therefore, the prospect of unseating President Mugabe is remote. What is undisputed however is the fact that Morgan Tsvangirai has given more headaches to Mugabe than anyone has in the last 27 years.
Zimbabwe has known of no other leader than President Mugabe. As Mugabe approaches 28 years in office and an election whose outcome may already be pre-determined not because of the will of the people but due to the power of incumbency, it is important that Zimbabweans ask themselves some basic questions whose answers will inform what kind of Zimbabwe they should have.
Having watched Arthur Mutambara’s BBC Hardtalk interview, and his paradoxical message, it occurred to me that it is important that the question of succession and leadership be interrogated critically now more than ever.
While it is undeniable that Mugabe is an eloquent and educated leader, it is also undeniable that his tenure in Zimbabwe has not produced the kind of results that should be associated with such an intellectual giant.
It is also common cause that with the exception of a few including the late Vice President Muzenda, Mugabe’s cabinet since independence has been dominated by intellectuals. What is clear is that such leadership has failed to give hope to Zimbabweans and has dismally failed to fight poverty and entrench the Rule of Law.
While Mugabe would like the world to believe that he is the champion of the poor, the last 27 years has demonstrated that he has no faith in poor minds and if anything he would rather have Jonathan Moyo, Joseph Made, Patrick Chinamasa and others than have a Tsvangirai or Wellington Chibhebhe in his cabinet, notwithstanding the fact that the latter may be more popular and in touch with the poor.
The difference between what Mutambara may want to see in Zimbabwe and what Mugabe believes in may be the same. What is evident is that Mugabe’s elite approach to development has failed in as much as Kaunda’s same approach failed as well and produced a Chiluba with the unavoidable consequences.
At the heart of the Mutambara and Tsvangirai feud is the failure by many people to recognise that the real agenda for change has to focus on Mugabe and not on the victims. Mugabe has been in charge for 27 years. He is after all the President of MDC, Zanu PF, and all other Zimbabweans. When he took the oath of office he did not do so as the President of a club called Zanu PF but as a President of Zimbabwe.
The sovereignty of Zimbabwe is not owned by Mugabe or Zanu PF but by the people. A leader should therefore emerge from the people irrespective of whether he is intelligent or not as long as the people are given a fair chance to express their will.
The question is whether President Mugabe’s reign has produced an environment in which the citizens of Zimbabwe are free to express their will.
In addition, President Mugabe, as is the case for any sitting president, has the natural advantage of incumbency. He has access to state resources without which it is plausible that Zanu PF would have disintegrated into worse factions than are evident in the opposition.
Has the President used his powers to promote oneness among Zimbabweans? Or has he used the Presidency to divide? How much of the state resources are being used to promote partisan interests? Is the state machinery neutral in the contestation for power or is it an instrument for entrenching the status quo ante? To what extent is the opposition able to access state resources to function?
Mugabe has won all the elections since independence. Is it the case that if he did not have state power that he would have won all these elections? One has to explain why it is the case that Zimbabwe is well endowed with great minds and yet on the radar screen of the opposition, such great intellectual minds are missing in action. If they are missing in action, why should people like Tsvangirai be excluded? Does a President have to be an intellectual for the country to have the change it deserves? Who should the change speak to?
Today, even Mugabe accepts that Tsvangirai has the confidence of the educated and working people while Zanu PF has the support of the rural masses. If this is the case, then Tsvangirai should be more qualified to lead the rural masses on the back of the allegation that he is not an intellectual and Mugabe should be the leader of the minority. Has Mugabe’s policies really helped the poor? How can Mugabe be compared with Tsvangirai when the latter has not been given a chance?
Ultimately the citizens should own the change agenda and yet in the case of Zimbabwe many intellectuals think that they should own the change agenda irrespective of their contribution to such change. While many would like change to take place in Zimbabwe, it is evident that they would rather invest as little as possible in such agendas.
However, if there is no investment in any process, the outcome may not be what you want. Mugabe has invested in making Zimbabwe a country in which liberation credentials and not service is the key to power. Under this construction, if you were never part of the struggle then you are less Zimbabwean and yet no one bothered to change the constitution to reflect such thinking.
If it is accepted that to be a President of Zimbabwe you must have participated in the struggle for independence, then surely how can people like Tsvangirai who have struggled for a better and new Zimbabwe be excluded from leading the post Mugabe era? Should the focus be on Tsvangirai or the people of Zimbabwe?
We now know that MDC was divided for whatever reasons in October 2005 and two formations emerged. Barely two years later, the formation that broke away from the Vatican and chose its own Pope would now want to be under the same Pope they vilify. If the new Pope who accepted to lead the formation strongly feels that he does not have what it takes to deliver the change, then surely he must resign or join the winners.
In as much as the Mutambara faction would not support Mugabe because of values, it should also be the case that they should not support Tsvangirai for the same reasons. However, if they have come to the inescapable conclusion that Tsvangirai, like Mandela, represents the majority then it is not too late to rally behind him and produce the baby that Zimbabweans want.
Yes it is easy to talk of the third way but without a leader such kind of language does not help the country move forward. Equally the talk of one candidate like the Kenyans discovered does not help advance the cause of democracy.
It should not be up to Tsvangirai to decide who should govern and he rightly refused to endorse a scheme in which leaders will be packaged in elite circles without the participation of the citizens.
If the Mutambara faction is confident that it has the people then what Tsvangirai is proposing makes sense. Why would Mutambara want Tsvangirai to enter into contracts on behalf of sovereign people?
Having accepted that the future of Zimbabwe may be led by someone less intellectual than Mugabe, it is important that citizens invest in ensuring that there are checks and balances that will allow for the development of society where pluralism can thrive.
Such investment should start now and it should not be the responsibility of the leader to invest in such an institutional framework of tolerance and justice but it should be incumbent upon all to start changing the conversations of hate into conversations of interest driven change. Ideological discussions need to start now with a view to locating the post-Mugabe era in an ideological matrix that is informed by global trends and developments.
Sunday, August 5, 2007
Rhodesia will never die
THE search for the root causes of the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis will be a subject for debate in the years to come.
However, what is clear today is that President Robert Mugabe has failed to democratise the Rhodesian settler capitalist formation as admitted by George Charamba in his weekly column under the pseudo name, Nathaniel Manheru, published by the Herald last Saturday under the title: “MDCs: Talks to nowhere”.
Charamba concedes that while Zimbabwe is not starving, it faces an escalated struggle against white industrial and merchant power that has decided to withhold production and to boycott supply. He goes on further to state as fact that white-owned business interests have decided to boycott the market in a price dispute with government.
Given Charamba’s role in the government, it is important that his views are taken seriously as they are not only informed but they have a material bearing on policy making. Charamba concludes that the empty supermarket shelves is a direct consequence of the treacherous abuse of white power. In his words, those who wield that power deliberately decided to starve the market of select goods for which prices were determined by government.
He then states that: “The empty shelves which the Western media have been showing would have been where those goods would have been seating but for the boycott. The full shelves which the propaganda cameras are too shy to acknowledge are full of goods whose prices are uncontrolled. It is a political struggle over who the boss is. And to the extent that we are dealing with two contesting power points — one Rhodesian and residual; the other African and ascending — it is clear this is a fight for real mastery, with Zimbabwe poised between full independence and neo-colonialism as the only two possible outcomes.
“The power is not in the supermarket shelves; it resides with the grower on the land. That grower is predominantly Zanu-PF. The trouble is Zanu PF often lives with unrealised power. For far too long, we have been minors in this economy whose workings we have never grasped, let alone tackled. The party must now use its countryside power to set new rules and ethics in the economy. That should be the direction.”
If this was a confession, I have no doubt that President Mugabe would resign from office for having lived for 27 years in the people’s house, State House, paying no rent with unrealised power. No explanation is provided by Charamba as to precisely why Zimbabweans should expect Zanu PF to use the power that it failed to use for 27 years in the next administration. Zanu PF had 27 years of unfettered control of state power with no visible opposition and yet it now wishes people to believe that it has been a minor in the economy whose workings it never grasped, let alone tackled.
What are the implications of Charamba’s honest admission of the policy bankruptcy that has underpinned the post-colonial state on the economic and political challenges facing Zimbabwe? If the government accepts that it has lived in the shadows of a sophisticated Rhodesian and settler economic model whose inner workings it has failed to grasp and yet the whole value proposition of independence has been underpinned by production and finance controlled by settler capital, it is important to interrogate the proposition that Rhodesia never really died.
If Rhodesia is alive and well today, as accepted by Charamba, what has the government been doing for the last 27 years? Who should be held culpable for non-delivery and failure to democratise the economy?
The critical challenge of the post-colonial state was to extend the gains of the civil rights movement to the economy and is so doing deal squarely with the colonially induced poverty of the majority of the population. Charamba accepts that Zimbabwean supermarket shelves are regrettably controlled by enemies of the state.
While the government would like the world and the Zimbabwean public to believe that the root of the crisis lies in the treacherous association between the MDC and settler capital, it is evident from Charamba’s confession that, indeed, the Zimbabwean appetite has been fed by Rhodesian values and products even under Mugabe’s watch.
This raises the question about the relationship between Zanu PF and settler capital. Could it be the case that if settler capital had not aligned itself with proponents of regime change; the status quo ante could have continued without any policy shift on indigenisation and empowerment issues?
Having accepted that Zanu PF had no program of redressing the inherited Rhodesian dual economic structure that has thrived and entrenched itself more under Mugabe’s watch, Charamba then proposes that the party must now use its countryside power to set new rules and ethics in the economy.
Why should the party resort to using the rural poor to assert its values and way of life on the economy as a substitute for making the hard policy choices required for any well functioning economic system? Is it the direction that Zimbabwe wants or deserves? Can any rational person trust a rider that has been on the saddle for 27 years and led the country nowhere, slowly to have the courage and wisdom to do everything that he has failed to do when he was not under any pressure?
In as much as Charamba has criticised the MDC for lacking the vision to transform Zimbabwe, it is important that he is consistent in his critical analysis of Zanu PF’s rule. It is common cause that no-one in the opposition has been privileged to be in any leadership position in government since independence.
When one critically examines what has been sustaining the Mugabe regime, it is evident that settler capital was the key and yet no-one has alleged that Mugabe was a puppet of the Rhodesians. However, the import of what Charamba is saying above is that Mugabe has never been in control of the economic pulse of the nation.
The Rhodesian economic system still remains as robust as it was during the colonial era. The farms have been alienated from settler control and yet the challenge of food security has become more acute after the land reform program confirming that Rhodesia was feeding Zimbabwe for as long as Rhodesian accepted that Zanu PF would be in government and not in power. The way of life that informed the Rhodesian system is diametrically opposed to what Mugabe stands for i.e. socialism and yet the two have co-existed comfortably until settler farmers made the mistake of poking their noses into who should be in government.
The world has watched with mixed feelings the unfolding land reclamation in Zimbabwe and it is true that the last 7 years have seen fundamental changes in the ownership of land. Many white farmers have been forced to change residential addresses but unfortunately many have seen through the political context of the reforms to the extent that they have not taken the route that many black Zimbabweans have taken to run away from the challenge.
In fact, I was not surprised when I met four former white farmers two weeks ago who were grateful that Mugabe had removed them from the land because they are now making more money as miners and traders to the extent that they would not even contemplate leaving Zimbabwe. In fact, they pointed out that they would never again get involved in black politics. They have learnt their lessons. They reckon that Rhodesia would have been alive and well had they accepted that the role of black under Mugabe was meant to keep them outside the economy while ensuring that Zanu PF would govern for their interests.
It was pointed out to me that even after the land reform program, Mugabe has substantially no problem with accommodating Rhodesian and foreign control of the economy as long as they can keep out of politics. It has also been highlighted that the victims of Mugabe over the last 27 years have largely been black. In fact, the majority of the businessmen arrested were black and Mugabe has involuntarily externalized black businesspersons than whites. In fact, many white businessmen are more optimistic about the future of Zimbabwe under Mugabe than under any other leader.
Only last week Meikles Africa, Kingdom and Tanganda proposed a merger that the Herald described as a “marriage made in heaven”. But what are the origins of Meikles Africa? The same article was kind enough to provide a brief background of the origins of the Meikles Group. Meikles is listed in London as well as in Zimbabwe. Its role in the colonial state is well established and respected as its role in the post-colonial state.
Meikles is the largest shareholder in both Tanganda and Kingdom. In Tanganda, the hotel group holds a controlling 44 percent stake and has been the biggest shareholder since 1943, thanks to existing family ties between Meikles founder, Thomas Meikle and Tanganda founder Florence Phillips. In Kingdom, Meikles became a strategic partner in 1999 with the acquisition of a 25 percent stake in the banking group.
Meikles has since raised its shareholding to 36 percent in KFHL. In fact, Kingdom has benefited significantly from its relationship with Meikles.
The Meikles story began in 1868 and over a hundred years later, the empire that was built by a settler family is now a multi-billion-dollar enterprise with tentacles in the entire economy. The government of Zimbabwe approved the external listing of the company. The largest tea plantations in the country are controlled by the group notwithstanding the land reform program.
The Meikles group outlived British control of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and has co-existed and prospered under a so-called Marxist regime. It would not be expected for such a company to be seen advocating any regime change. The government has already used us to demonstrate the futility of being critical of the policy bankruptcy that Charamba eloquently pointed out in his column.
To the extent that they key economic decisions in Zimbabwe continue to be made by persons whose interests many not be aligned with the majority of Zimbabweans, the prospect of any regime change are remote. The poor will play a convenient role in keeping the business sector in check and the RBZ will do its part in monitoring the political behavior of this important class and rewarding them with price increases in return for compliance.
The economy will continue to be controlled by the nameless and politically voiceless Rhodesian construction while blacks will fight for the control of a fast crumpling state system underpinned by hopelessness and poverty for the majority unless Charamba’s message is digested in its full context.
Rhodesia is still in control of not only the shelf spaces but has the wherewithal to re-invent Mugabe if only he understands that white Rhodesians may not be opposed to African dictatorship as long as the victims are black. Under Rhodesia, capitalism was for whites with zero tolerance on black capital formation. For the last 27 years, the modus operandi has been largely the same with marginally better tolerance on black capital formation.
However, what is clear today is that President Robert Mugabe has failed to democratise the Rhodesian settler capitalist formation as admitted by George Charamba in his weekly column under the pseudo name, Nathaniel Manheru, published by the Herald last Saturday under the title: “MDCs: Talks to nowhere”.
Charamba concedes that while Zimbabwe is not starving, it faces an escalated struggle against white industrial and merchant power that has decided to withhold production and to boycott supply. He goes on further to state as fact that white-owned business interests have decided to boycott the market in a price dispute with government.
Given Charamba’s role in the government, it is important that his views are taken seriously as they are not only informed but they have a material bearing on policy making. Charamba concludes that the empty supermarket shelves is a direct consequence of the treacherous abuse of white power. In his words, those who wield that power deliberately decided to starve the market of select goods for which prices were determined by government.
He then states that: “The empty shelves which the Western media have been showing would have been where those goods would have been seating but for the boycott. The full shelves which the propaganda cameras are too shy to acknowledge are full of goods whose prices are uncontrolled. It is a political struggle over who the boss is. And to the extent that we are dealing with two contesting power points — one Rhodesian and residual; the other African and ascending — it is clear this is a fight for real mastery, with Zimbabwe poised between full independence and neo-colonialism as the only two possible outcomes.
“The power is not in the supermarket shelves; it resides with the grower on the land. That grower is predominantly Zanu-PF. The trouble is Zanu PF often lives with unrealised power. For far too long, we have been minors in this economy whose workings we have never grasped, let alone tackled. The party must now use its countryside power to set new rules and ethics in the economy. That should be the direction.”
If this was a confession, I have no doubt that President Mugabe would resign from office for having lived for 27 years in the people’s house, State House, paying no rent with unrealised power. No explanation is provided by Charamba as to precisely why Zimbabweans should expect Zanu PF to use the power that it failed to use for 27 years in the next administration. Zanu PF had 27 years of unfettered control of state power with no visible opposition and yet it now wishes people to believe that it has been a minor in the economy whose workings it never grasped, let alone tackled.
What are the implications of Charamba’s honest admission of the policy bankruptcy that has underpinned the post-colonial state on the economic and political challenges facing Zimbabwe? If the government accepts that it has lived in the shadows of a sophisticated Rhodesian and settler economic model whose inner workings it has failed to grasp and yet the whole value proposition of independence has been underpinned by production and finance controlled by settler capital, it is important to interrogate the proposition that Rhodesia never really died.
If Rhodesia is alive and well today, as accepted by Charamba, what has the government been doing for the last 27 years? Who should be held culpable for non-delivery and failure to democratise the economy?
The critical challenge of the post-colonial state was to extend the gains of the civil rights movement to the economy and is so doing deal squarely with the colonially induced poverty of the majority of the population. Charamba accepts that Zimbabwean supermarket shelves are regrettably controlled by enemies of the state.
While the government would like the world and the Zimbabwean public to believe that the root of the crisis lies in the treacherous association between the MDC and settler capital, it is evident from Charamba’s confession that, indeed, the Zimbabwean appetite has been fed by Rhodesian values and products even under Mugabe’s watch.
This raises the question about the relationship between Zanu PF and settler capital. Could it be the case that if settler capital had not aligned itself with proponents of regime change; the status quo ante could have continued without any policy shift on indigenisation and empowerment issues?
Having accepted that Zanu PF had no program of redressing the inherited Rhodesian dual economic structure that has thrived and entrenched itself more under Mugabe’s watch, Charamba then proposes that the party must now use its countryside power to set new rules and ethics in the economy.
Why should the party resort to using the rural poor to assert its values and way of life on the economy as a substitute for making the hard policy choices required for any well functioning economic system? Is it the direction that Zimbabwe wants or deserves? Can any rational person trust a rider that has been on the saddle for 27 years and led the country nowhere, slowly to have the courage and wisdom to do everything that he has failed to do when he was not under any pressure?
In as much as Charamba has criticised the MDC for lacking the vision to transform Zimbabwe, it is important that he is consistent in his critical analysis of Zanu PF’s rule. It is common cause that no-one in the opposition has been privileged to be in any leadership position in government since independence.
When one critically examines what has been sustaining the Mugabe regime, it is evident that settler capital was the key and yet no-one has alleged that Mugabe was a puppet of the Rhodesians. However, the import of what Charamba is saying above is that Mugabe has never been in control of the economic pulse of the nation.
The Rhodesian economic system still remains as robust as it was during the colonial era. The farms have been alienated from settler control and yet the challenge of food security has become more acute after the land reform program confirming that Rhodesia was feeding Zimbabwe for as long as Rhodesian accepted that Zanu PF would be in government and not in power. The way of life that informed the Rhodesian system is diametrically opposed to what Mugabe stands for i.e. socialism and yet the two have co-existed comfortably until settler farmers made the mistake of poking their noses into who should be in government.
The world has watched with mixed feelings the unfolding land reclamation in Zimbabwe and it is true that the last 7 years have seen fundamental changes in the ownership of land. Many white farmers have been forced to change residential addresses but unfortunately many have seen through the political context of the reforms to the extent that they have not taken the route that many black Zimbabweans have taken to run away from the challenge.
In fact, I was not surprised when I met four former white farmers two weeks ago who were grateful that Mugabe had removed them from the land because they are now making more money as miners and traders to the extent that they would not even contemplate leaving Zimbabwe. In fact, they pointed out that they would never again get involved in black politics. They have learnt their lessons. They reckon that Rhodesia would have been alive and well had they accepted that the role of black under Mugabe was meant to keep them outside the economy while ensuring that Zanu PF would govern for their interests.
It was pointed out to me that even after the land reform program, Mugabe has substantially no problem with accommodating Rhodesian and foreign control of the economy as long as they can keep out of politics. It has also been highlighted that the victims of Mugabe over the last 27 years have largely been black. In fact, the majority of the businessmen arrested were black and Mugabe has involuntarily externalized black businesspersons than whites. In fact, many white businessmen are more optimistic about the future of Zimbabwe under Mugabe than under any other leader.
Only last week Meikles Africa, Kingdom and Tanganda proposed a merger that the Herald described as a “marriage made in heaven”. But what are the origins of Meikles Africa? The same article was kind enough to provide a brief background of the origins of the Meikles Group. Meikles is listed in London as well as in Zimbabwe. Its role in the colonial state is well established and respected as its role in the post-colonial state.
Meikles is the largest shareholder in both Tanganda and Kingdom. In Tanganda, the hotel group holds a controlling 44 percent stake and has been the biggest shareholder since 1943, thanks to existing family ties between Meikles founder, Thomas Meikle and Tanganda founder Florence Phillips. In Kingdom, Meikles became a strategic partner in 1999 with the acquisition of a 25 percent stake in the banking group.
Meikles has since raised its shareholding to 36 percent in KFHL. In fact, Kingdom has benefited significantly from its relationship with Meikles.
The Meikles story began in 1868 and over a hundred years later, the empire that was built by a settler family is now a multi-billion-dollar enterprise with tentacles in the entire economy. The government of Zimbabwe approved the external listing of the company. The largest tea plantations in the country are controlled by the group notwithstanding the land reform program.
The Meikles group outlived British control of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and has co-existed and prospered under a so-called Marxist regime. It would not be expected for such a company to be seen advocating any regime change. The government has already used us to demonstrate the futility of being critical of the policy bankruptcy that Charamba eloquently pointed out in his column.
To the extent that they key economic decisions in Zimbabwe continue to be made by persons whose interests many not be aligned with the majority of Zimbabweans, the prospect of any regime change are remote. The poor will play a convenient role in keeping the business sector in check and the RBZ will do its part in monitoring the political behavior of this important class and rewarding them with price increases in return for compliance.
The economy will continue to be controlled by the nameless and politically voiceless Rhodesian construction while blacks will fight for the control of a fast crumpling state system underpinned by hopelessness and poverty for the majority unless Charamba’s message is digested in its full context.
Rhodesia is still in control of not only the shelf spaces but has the wherewithal to re-invent Mugabe if only he understands that white Rhodesians may not be opposed to African dictatorship as long as the victims are black. Under Rhodesia, capitalism was for whites with zero tolerance on black capital formation. For the last 27 years, the modus operandi has been largely the same with marginally better tolerance on black capital formation.
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